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Abstract
Background: Although environmental policy decisions are often based in part on both risk
assessment information and environmental justice concerns, formalized approaches for addressing
inequality or inequity when estimating the health benefits of pollution control have been lacking.
Inequality indicators that fulfill basic axioms and agree with relevant definitions and concepts in
health benefits analysis and environmental justice analysis can allow for quantitative examination of
efficiency-equality tradeoffs in pollution control policies.
Methods: To develop appropriate inequality indicators for health benefits analysis, we provide
relevant definitions from the fields of risk assessment and environmental justice and consider the
implications. We evaluate axioms proposed in past studies of inequality indicators and develop
additional axioms relevant to this context. We survey the literature on previous applications of
inequality indicators and evaluate five candidate indicators in reference to our proposed axioms.
We present an illustrative pollution control example to determine whether our selected indicators
provide interpretable information.
Results and Conclusions: We conclude that an inequality indicator for health benefits analysis
should not decrease when risk is transferred from a low-risk to high-risk person, and that it should
decrease when risk is transferred from a high-risk to low-risk person (Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle), and that it should be able to have total inequality divided into its constituent parts
(subgroup decomposability). We additionally propose that an ideal indicator should avoid value
judgments about the relative importance of transfers at different percentiles of the risk distribution,
incorporate health risk with evidence about differential susceptibility, include baseline distributions
of risk, use appropriate geographic resolution and scope, and consider multiple competing policy
alternatives. Given these criteria, we select the Atkinson index as the single indicator most
appropriate for health benefits analysis, with other indicators useful for sensitivity analysis. Our
illustrative pollution control example demonstrates how these indices can help a policy maker
determine control strategies that are dominated from an efficiency and equality standpoint, those
that are dominated for some but not all societal viewpoints on inequality averseness, and those that
are on the optimal efficiency-equality frontier, allowing for more informed pollution control
policies.
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Background
Environmental policy decisions in the United States are
often informed by two lines of evidence. Risk assessment
techniques can quantify the magnitude of public health
benefits anticipated from proposed control strategies
(hereafter referred to as health benefits analysis), a process
required for all regulations with significant economic
impacts [1]. As these analyses are conducted within the
context of benefit-cost analysis, the focus has historically
been on aggregate benefits as a measure of the "efficiency"
of the control measure, with little consideration of either
the baseline distribution of risk or how the benefits are
distributed across the population.
At the same time, questions about environmental justice
and the distribution of affected populations are influen-
tial in many environmental policy decisions. An Executive
Order requires that all federal agencies identify and
address disproportionate impacts of policies and pro-
grams on minority and low-income populations [2].
Given this Executive Order, along with growing interest
among community members and researchers, environ-
mental justice concerns dominate how many communi-
ties view environmental issues [3,4].
Although many policy decisions are influenced by both
mandates, there has been little systematic consideration
to date of how concepts relevant to environmental justice
could be incorporated into the health benefits analysis
framework (or, more generally, how health benefits anal-
ysis could better incorporate variability in risk). Some
environmental justice analyses provide quantitative esti-
mates or indicators of inequality, but rather than quanti-
fying health risks, focus on issues such as demographic
patterns of populations proximate to hazardous waste
sites [5-8] or sources of toxic chemicals [9-11]. This can
help determine if facility siting was discriminatory but
may have little direct relevance to the distribution of
health outcomes. Many risk-based equity studies stop
short of quantifying health benefits, instead characteriz-
ing inequities in air toxic emissions [12-14] or concentra-
tions [15], or risk scenarios [16,17]. A focus on
concentrations or exposures is often logical, given a lack
of evidence on health outcomes, but potentially omits
important concepts of susceptibility or non-linearity in
dose-response functions. Even those studies that applied
inequality indicators in risk assessment [18,19] did not
address issues related to pollution control (rather than the
baseline distribution of risk) or the implications of choos-
ing one indicator over another.
Although past studies have not explicitly brought con-
cepts important to environmental justice and risk assess-
ment together, there is growing interest and improved
methods to do so. For example, cumulative risk assess-
ment [20] quantitatively addresses some concerns of envi-
ronmental justice advocates by focusing on community
and individual risks, rather than specific contaminants.
Increasing scientific information about socioeconomi-
cally patterned exposure heterogeneity or susceptibility
linked to environmental contaminants [21] can be used
to better estimate the distribution of health benefits. In
general, multiple studies have articulated approaches for
incorporating distributional concerns into economic cost-
benefit analysis [22,23], albeit without the risk assess-
ment components. Thus, the development of methods to
better articulate inequality issues within health benefits
analysis would be timely.
The critical question is therefore: can one appropriately
quantify inequality or inequity in health benefits analysis,
and if so, how? Extensive work has been conducted to date
on the development and evaluation of indicators of ine-
quality in other contexts [24-26], and it is not our intent
to replicate this work. Rather, we focus on developing the
most appropriate method for determining whether a pol-
lution control strategy increases or decreases health ine-
qualities.
To achieve this goal, we first present key definitions
needed to understand the similarities and differences in
the frameworks of health benefits analysis and environ-
mental justice analysis. We propose axioms that an ine-
quality indicator for health benefits analysis must follow,
including both general axioms previously considered and
specific axioms in the context of health benefits analysis.
We use these axioms to evaluate indicators developed or
applied in previous studies and illustrate the potential
interpretability of selected indicators through an illustra-
tive pollution control example in which efficiency-equal-
ity tradeoff frontiers are developed. We conclude by
discussing strengths and weaknesses of our proposed
approach and by outlining areas in which further method-
ological development is required.
Definitions and concepts
In this section, we present key concepts underlying both
health benefits analysis and environmental justice analy-
sis. We focus on developing working definitions of equal-
ity and equity, highlighting the differences in how
environmental justice and risk assessment/health benefits
analysis understand these concepts. A deeper understand-
ing of equality and equity also clarifies the extent of our
ability to quantify such measurements.
Definitions: Health benefits analysis
Health benefits analysis involves the application of risk
assessment techniques to estimate the magnitude of
health benefits associated with pollution control meas-
ures. These measurements are then used as a componentInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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of benefit-cost analysis, which involves estimation of the
incremental costs and benefits associated with a given
policy, often both expressed in monetary terms for com-
parability. While health benefits analysis can consider dis-
tributional information, the aggregate societal benefit has
been the measure of concern in most applications to date.
More refined distributional information has generally not
been utilized except to the extent that it improves the
aggregate benefit estimates. This should be differentiated
from other risk assessment applications, where the objec-
tive may be to determine whether a maximally exposed
individual has a risk exceeding a predefined threshold.
Conventionally, a distinction is made between risk assess-
ment, the use of the factual base to define the health
effects of exposures of individuals to hazardous materials,
and risk management, the process of selecting among pol-
icy alternatives by balancing risk assessment findings with
social, economic, and political concerns [27]. Multiple
studies have debated whether this careful distinction leads
to more objective risk assessment or imposes its own set
of value judgments that impair decision-making [28,29].
Whether or not the differentiation between risk assess-
ment and risk management is useful and meaningful, it
reflects a desire to ensure that subjective judgments within
the risk assessment are made explicit, and that important
choices that may influence policy decisions are not hid-
den from the policy maker.
Definitions: Environmental justice analysis
While it is problematic that health benefits analysis has
not historically incorporated distributional impacts, link-
ing environmental justice with health benefits analysis is
further complicated by difficulties in developing func-
tional definitions of justice, equity, or equality. These def-
initions would be needed either for formal analyses or for
comparisons across studies. We provide basic definitions
of equality and equity, and consider how inequality could
be formally aggregated, before drawing conclusions about
the implications for health benefits analysis.
Equality is one of the core components of justice, charac-
terized by homogeneity or sameness among individuals
or social groups [30]. It is often depicted as uniformity in
rights or experiences despite differences in resources,
capabilities and backgrounds. Equality is a fundamentally
comparative concept, judged on the basis of relative fac-
tors that constitute an individual's or group's experience
within society, such as income, utility, resources or capac-
ity [31]. Equality can be understood along a continuum
from origin to procedure to outcome, with numerous cat-
egorizations including equality of opportunity, freedom
from discrimination, equal treatment before the law,
equal benefit, equal status and equality of results. Within
the context of health benefits analysis, despite inherent
differences among individuals and initial unequal condi-
tions [32], inequality can decrease through our ability to
alter regulations and reduce pollutant exposures and/or
health risks. Of note, equality could theoretically be
improved by "leveling down" and increasing health risks
among low-risk individuals, but this would most likely
not be sensible in a context where efficiency and aggregate
social welfare were also of interest. Explicit development
of efficiency-equality tradeoff frontiers for pollution con-
trol policies can empirically test these preferences.
In contrast, the concept of inequity identifies the subset of
inequalities that are deemed unjust and unfair by a
socially-derived calculus [33]. The three central determi-
nants of inequity are whether the difference is avoidable,
undeserved, and remediable [34]. For example, health
inequalities stemming from genetic differences or freely-
chosen health damaging behavior would not be consid-
ered inequitable; variations resulting from unknown
exposure to unhealthy working conditions or limited
social mobility would be categorized as inequitable [33].
Table 1: Four Approaches for Inequality Comparisons [36]
Concept Who/what is reference point? Benefits Limitations
Relative to average The mean inequality of all 
individuals within a group
Often the easiest metric to obtain 
and compare. Can be used for 
both individual and group vs. group 
comparisons.
Group averages can mask 
important inter- individual 
inequalities
Relative to the best- off Experience of the single best-off 
person in society
Can identify differences between 
poorest and richest individuals; 
easy to quantify for income
The best-off may not be a realistic 
equality standard, and the 
experience of the best off person 
may be difficult to quantify in a risk 
context
Relative to all those better off The range of experiences of all 
those who are better- off than a 
given person/group
Allows a deeper understanding of 
scope of inequality within a group
Hard to identify the level at which 
claims would be deemed unequal
Relative to the best- off person 
whose condition is not anomalous
Compares individual claims to a 
determined "good enough" level
Allows for a more reasonable 
expectation of equality
Hard to define "not anomalous" in 
real-world contextInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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Equity is divided into a number of subcategories. One
common division is between procedural and outcome (or
distributive) components. Procedural equity focuses on
fairness in the processes that gives rise to outcomes [35].
Examples include inclusive and open participation in
public proceedings and making specific attempts to
include affected or disadvantaged individuals in the
debate. Outcome equity imposes justice on the ultimate
distribution of resources at the completion of the process,
requiring the final outcome – but not the intermediate
process –to meet the test of fairness.
These definitions make it clear that quantitative compari-
sons of inequality will be more feasible than quantitative
comparisons of equity or justice. This leads to the ques-
tion of how one can formally compare inequality claims.
One significant question involves whether the social unit
of concern would be the individual or social groups. Since
important interindividual inequality can be masked by
group averages [36,37], individual-level information is
ideal, but may not be practical or meaningful in some
contexts. A determination regarding the reference point
for evaluating claims must be considered next. Temkin
provides four useful conceptualizations, depicted in Table
1, which can be used to determine the basis for compari-
son when judging inequality [36]. A third component of
comparing inequality claims involves aggregating claims
and assessing their relative importance. Three methods
typically used for calculating the extent of a given inequal-
ity are summarized in Table 2[36].
Conclusions: Differences in definitions and frameworks
Given the above definitions, there are clear distinctions in
how environmental justice and health benefits analyses
would define and incorporate notions of equality and
equity. First, environmental justice and health benefits
analysis focus on different points on the continuum from
origin to procedures to outcome. Environmental justice
advocates often focus on procedural fairness, with the
belief that inequities in health outcomes stem from the
lack of influence of low-income or minority communities
on facility siting decisions and institutionalized discrimi-
nation in the application of environmental laws [38]. The
objective is to improve outcomes, but with a focus on
process equity as a means to achieve this end.
On the other hand, health benefits analysis is explicitly
focused on quantifying end states (exposures and health
outcomes) as a means of affecting public policy, without
regard to procedural issues or community involvement or
input [39]. Although this difference in focus is important,
environmental justice advocates are ultimately concerned
about outcomes. Thus, techniques that can appropriately
quantify the magnitude and distribution of exposures and
health risks should be relevant.
Additional differences would be related to how quantita-
tive comparisons of inequality are made. Most environ-
mental justice analyses compare demographic patterns at
varying proximities to pollution sources [6,7] or expo-
sures across defined socioeconomic or racial groups [15],
clearly involving group-level comparisons. While health
benefits analysis is generally conducted at geographically
aggregated levels due to technical or financial constraints
in accurately assessing an individual's experience, the
"gold standard" would involve the use of individual-level
information when available.
In addition, environmental justice advocates typically
compare the inequality claims of disadvantaged groups to
experiences of more privileged geographic and demo-
graphic groups, implicitly employing the "relative to all
those better off" comparison (Table 1). This is not a pre-
cise fit, given the focus on group experience rather than
that of individuals and the fact that the reference group for
environmental injustice claims may change over time or
across policies. For health benefits analyses, comparisons
other than "relative to average" or "relative to all those
better off" may often be impractical due to data limita-
tions and the difficulty of characterizing risk at the tails of
the distribution.
Finally, the methods for aggregating individual claims
may differ (Table 2). Environmental justice advocates
openly incorporate weighting and a maximin approach
into their analyses in order to fully consider socioeco-
Table 2: Methods of Devising Composite Inequality Measures [36]
Model Method of Calculation
Additive principle Sum of each individual complaint of inequality; the higher the number, 
the greater the inequality
Weighted additive principle Claims with greater significance are given greater value in the 
assessment
Maximim principle The extent to which societal institutions maximize the average level of 
the worst-off groupInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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nomic factors; as above, these measures often vary by sit-
uation. The strictly additive nature of health benefits
analysis (as conventionally applied) may run counter to
this more adaptable approach.
These differences in frameworks are all based on concepts
of inequality, and do not address whether inequality or
inequity would be more appropriate. Equity, unlike
equality, does not lend itself to being quantified, since it
incorporates elements of socially constructed fairness and
justice that are beyond the scope of mathematical analy-
sis. Since questions of societal fairness (and therefore
equity) are central in environmental justice, and given the
above issues, it would seem that the tensions in orienta-
tion between environmental justice and quantitative
health benefits analysis are impossible to reconcile. That
being said, explicit incorporation of exposure heterogene-
ity and susceptibility information can allow us to better
evaluate equality in health benefits analysis, which can
partially inform determinations of equity if relevant indi-
vidual information is included. We therefore aim to
develop quantitative indicators of inequality for health
benefits analysis that have the flexibility to incorporate
sufficient information to inform outcome equity judg-
ments for environmental justice advocates.
In summary, our definitions emphasize that health bene-
fits analysis provides a measure of the efficiency of a con-
trol strategy, aggregated across the population. While this
framework has not typically incorporated inequality, a
quantitative measure of inequality that takes into account
the above definitions is feasible and interpretable. Ulti-
mately, this would allow one to evaluate the impact of
pollution control policies on both efficiency and equality,
and determine which policies are dominated from both
perspectives and which lie on an optimal tradeoff frontier.
Results
Axioms for inequality indicators for health benefits 
analysis
In this section, we review the axioms proposed in past
evaluations of inequality indicators, evaluating each for
its relevance to health benefits analysis. We then propose
a set of additional axioms that should be imposed for an
inequality indicator in this context to be meaningful and
interpretable.
1. Pigou-Dalton transfer principle
This axiom (as applied to income inequality) requires that
an indicator not decrease when income is transferred from
a poorer to a richer person, and that it decrease when
income is transferred from a richer to a poorer person
[40]. This is predicated on the mean of the distribution
remaining unchanged and the amount of the transfer
being less than the existing gap [36,40]. This axiom con-
siders inequality as a gradient rather than a threshold con-
cept; in other words, even a transfer from the wealthiest to
the second-wealthiest person in society should reduce ine-
quality. The application for health benefits analysis is
analogous: if a policy results in the redistribution of risk
from high-risk to low-risk populations, then an inequality
indicator should decrease accordingly.
The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle has not been seri-
ously disputed in the income inequality literature, given
its importance for intuitive interpretation of inequality
indicators. While some have argued that it is less interpret-
able for health given the difficulty of "transferring health"
[41], pollution control decisions implicitly involve
choices about redistribution of exposures and therefore
health. Given this, and since our objective in interpreting
changes in risk distributions parallels interest in income
inequality, we accept this axiom for health benefits analy-
sis. The principal difference relative to income inequality
assessment is empirical rather than theoretical; some indi-
cators violate the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle under
circumstances that are relatively unimportant for income
inequality but may be more significant for risk inequality
(i.e., transfers among individuals well above the mean).
2. Scale invariance
Scale invariance requires that an indicator not change
given uniform proportional changes across the popula-
tion. This would imply that relative comparisons are most
important for inequality, as opposed to translation invar-
iance (where an indicator would not change given uni-
form additive changes across the population), which
would focus on absolute differences. While it is clear that
this axiom should be followed for the case of changing
income to different currencies [24], there has been exten-
sive debate about whether scale invariance for real
changes in income would or would not be desirable.
Some have argued that proportional increases in income
should increase inequality, as the absolute gap between
the poor and wealthy has increased [42], and the assets
added to society have not been distributed in an equitable
fashion [36]. Others have argued that proportional
increases in income should decrease inequality, given the
diminishing marginal utilities of income [43]. Of course,
many accept scale invariance as a useful and important
axiom as well.
For health benefits analysis, the marginal utility of risk
reduction is likely not constant across levels of health risk.
It could be argued that this uneven marginal utility sup-
ports explicitly rejecting scale invariance, especially since
the question of unit conversion does not pertain (as it
would with income) unless intermediate measures such
as exposure (which is based on concentration units that
could be converted) are used. On the other hand, relativeInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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differences in health risk could be more meaningful than
absolute differences [24], especially given that risk calcu-
lations are generally multiplicative with uncertain relative
risks associated with exposures. Survey evidence suggests
that the degree to which scale and/or translation invari-
ance is accepted depends on the baseline income/risk and
the magnitude of the increment [44], and that there is sig-
nificant support for intermediate positions [45].
For this axiom, since there are compelling arguments in
either direction, we conclude that either scale invariant or
non-scale invariant indicators may be appropriate, with
the choice potentially dependent on the context. For
problems involving small changes in a risk that does not
vary substantially across the population, the marginal
utilities of risk reductions will be reasonably similar and
scale invariance may be more appropriate.
3. Anonymity
This axiom requires that an inequality measure be inde-
pendent of any characteristics of individuals other than
the welfare indicator whose distribution is being evalu-
ated [26]. This axiom has been disputed, with some argu-
ing that evaluation of inequalities without consideration
of population characteristics is inappropriate given the
importance of social factors as predictors of health and
well-being [46]. Anonymity has some appeal, as it avoids
identifiability and situations where the indicator can
change without health risk changing. However, environ-
mental justice by definition is concerned with sociodemo-
graphic factors and comparisons between groups, and
linking inequality with inequity requires such informa-
tion. Moreover, understanding geographic patterns of
health risks may facilitate the development of pollution
control strategies. Thus, although there are some contexts
in which anonymity may be reasonable, we prefer indica-
tors where relevant individual characteristics can be incor-
porated.
4. Subgroup decomposability
An indicator that is subgroup decomposable (or additive
separable) can have total inequality divided into constitu-
ent parts of the distribution. Typical applications might
include segmentation of inequality into within-group ver-
sus between-group inequality, or evaluation of the contri-
bution of various population subgroups to overall
inequality [26].
Some have argued that for inequality, the whole may not
be identical to the sum of the parts [36], since interpreta-
tion of inequality in a subpopulation may depend on
what is occurring in the rest of the population. However,
the practical appeal of a subgroup decomposable measure
for health benefits analysis is substantial. It enhances
interpretability and allows population characteristics
(such as socioeconomic status) to be incorporated into
the analysis, with consideration of whether societal ine-
quality is largely explained by between-group differences.
Most importantly, a subgroup decomposable measure can
incorporate key concepts from risk assessment (i.e., sub-
population susceptibility) with concerns from environ-
mental justice (i.e., distribution of impacts across
population subgroups of concern).
Additional axioms
Other standard axioms, such as analytic tractability (the
indicator should be computable in standard applica-
tions), appropriateness (the indicator should adequately
reflect perceptions about inequality), and normalization
(the indicator should either follow a defined range or be
able to be transformed to do so) [24-26], are fairly
uncontroversial in this context or others and do not
require further attention. Others may be controversial in
other settings but are largely irrelevant to health benefits
analysis. The principle of population (invariance of an
indicator to the replication of the population) is one
example, since the population is fixed across control pol-
icy options in most health benefits analyses.
In addition to these conventional axioms, for an indicator
of inequality to be meaningful for health benefits analy-
sis, it must fulfill additional criteria. As mentioned above,
quantification of health benefits contains multiple
assumptions and uncertainties not found in evaluations
of income inequality. While the additional axioms pertain
more to the welfare measure than the indicator itself,
some are generalizable to other contexts.
5. The analyst must not impose a value judgment about the relative 
importance of transfers at different percentiles of the risk distribution
As mentioned above, risk assessment has often been dis-
tinguished from risk management, partly to reduce sub-
jectivity within risk assessments, or, at a minimum, to
ensure that any subjective judgments made within the risk
assessment are presented explicitly. When quantifying
inequality in health benefits analysis, any single indicator
will involve implicit choices about the relative importance
of transfers at different percentiles of the distribution,
whether the relevant comparison is with the average or the
best-off individual, and so forth. Even an indicator with
equal weights across the population involves an implicit
value judgment. By choosing a single way of quantifying
inequality, the analyst has imposed his/her judgment
about these issues.
This problem can be solved one of two ways. First, the
analyst could use an indicator that includes an explicit
parameter that changes the weights placed on various per-
centiles of the distribution. In that way, a single weighting
scheme would not be endorsed, as the sensitivity of policyInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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decisions to values of this parameter should be analyzed.
Alternatively, the analyst could use multiple indicators
that reasonably cover most relevant viewpoints about ine-
quality, even if the individual indicators do not allow for
multiple weighting schemes. Ideally, both approaches
would be used. In any case, the sensitivity of the indicator
to transfers in various portions of the distribution should
be explicitly presented, so that the decision maker cor-
rectly interprets the outputs of the analysis.
6. The welfare measure must be as close to a measure of health risk 
as possible. If quantifying risk is impossible or there is no differential 
susceptibility, then exposure should be evaluated. If quantifying 
exposure is impossible or there is no differential exposure, then 
concentrations in relevant media should be evaluated
Since our objective is to inform health benefits analyses, it
is important to base the inequality indicator on health evi-
dence. Although quantitative evidence of differential sus-
ceptibility of population subgroups to a pollutant is often
limited, this axiom emphasizes the importance of this evi-
dence. At a minimum, the analyst should attempt to
determine if there are any differences in baseline health
status that would influence the distribution of health
impacts. In other words, if a pollutant increases everyone's
risk of an emergency room visit for asthma by 5%, then
individuals or groups with a higher baseline rate of
asthma emergency room visits (such as low-income Afri-
can-Americans) would contribute a disproportionate
amount to the total public health burden [47]. Differen-
tial susceptibility from a relative and absolute perspective
should be explored.
Since there are often multiple health outcomes associated
with a single exposure, the welfare measure should be
based when possible on aggregate severity-weighted
health outcomes (such as quality-adjusted life years lost).
If evidence is lacking to estimate these measures, or if use
of an aggregate health measure would result in the inabil-
ity to reasonably incorporate susceptibility, a single health
outcome should be chosen that either contributes most to
severity-weighted health measures or that is of interest to
decision makers for other reasons. Given sufficient evi-
dence, the geographic and demographic distribution of
risk per unit exposure will differ by health outcome, since
susceptibility is disease-specific. If multiple health out-
comes are of concern but cannot be aggregated, the ine-
quality indicator should be calculated for each, and the
ranking of the policy options should be compared.
7. The inequality indicator should not be applied without 
consideration of the baseline distribution of risk
This axiom is intended to capture the concern regarding
cumulative environmental burdens placed on low-
income or minority communities, which might otherwise
be omitted from the analysis. This issue is especially
important if a pollutant has a non-linear dose-response
function, where knowing the current level of exposure is
critical in quantifying the incremental health risk. This
would generally involve estimation of baseline exposures
to the pollutant of concern and the baseline incidence of
the health outcome in question, including at small geo-
graphic scales and across sociodemographic variables of
interest. A more refined approach in a multipollutant con-
text would adopt a cumulative risk assessment framework
[20], systematically assessing stressors with similar mech-
anisms of action and exploring the possibility of synergis-
tic or antagonistic effects with the pollutant(s) of interest
for the analysis.
8. The inequality indicator should be estimated for the geographic 
scope and resolution that are used for the health benefits analysis, 
but the sensitivity of the findings to scope and resolution should be 
evaluated. In particular, an inequality indicator should be estimated 
with the finest geographic resolution possible, given available data 
and analytical capabilities
As mentioned earlier, individual-level information is the
theoretical ideal when making determinations of inequal-
ity, but data and analytical limitations make coarser reso-
lution necessary. Health benefits analyses often have
county-level resolution or greater [48,49], limited by the
complexity of atmospheric dispersion models and by epi-
demiological evidence based on air pollution measure-
ments at central site monitors. This leads to obvious
difficulties, since multiple studies have shown that the
findings of an equity analysis (as expressed by demo-
graphic patterns near sources) depend on the geographic
resolution of the analysis [6,14,50,51]. Larger geographic
aggregates can contribute to ecological fallacies with the
loss of higher-resolution data, unless the populations are
homogeneous with respect to all characteristics of interest.
Whereas there is a theoretically correct geographic resolu-
tion for an inequality analysis, the appropriate geographic
scope of the analysis is harder to define. Health benefits
analyses are often based on political boundaries (state,
regional, or national scope) rather than boundaries based
on exposure concepts. The inequality assessment should
use the scope selected for the health benefits analysis for
comparability, but sensitivity analyses should be con-
ducted to determine if the optimal policies are stable with
respect to modifications to the geographic scope.
9. When efficiency-equality tradeoffs are important for policy 
decisions, the inequality indicator should be derived for multiple 
competing policy alternatives. If this is not possible, qualitative 
interpretations are most appropriate
One of the stipulations related to the Executive Order
requiring health benefits analyses for major regulations
[1] was that the agency must consider a number of regula-
tory alternatives and select the least costly, most cost-effec-International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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tive, or least burdensome alternative to achieve the stated
objectives [52]. In general, benefit-cost analyses or cost-
effectiveness analyses are most useful when a baseline/ref-
erence case is developed and multiple interventions are
compared against that baseline/reference case.
In our case, it is even more important to consider multiple
control options. An inequality measure may be sensitive
to geographic scale, geographic resolution, pollutant, and
health outcome, among other factors. Unlike premature
deaths or dollars spent, inequality indicators are difficult
to compare across applications. If a decision maker were
told how much an inequality indicator changed as a result
of a policy change, along with an estimate of health ben-
efits, it would be difficult to use this information by itself
to make definitive policy decisions (aside from the quali-
tative determination of whether inequality increased or
decreased). Evaluating how the inequality indicator
changes as a result of multiple potential alternatives
allows for the determination of efficiency-equality trade-
offs (if any). Aggregate health benefits and changes in ine-
quality can be plotted against one another to determine
which policies are dominated from both efficiency and
equality standpoints, and which are on an optimal trade-
off frontier.
Summary
In summary, an indicator of inequality for health benefits
analysis must follow a set of rules in order to be meaning-
ful and interpretable. Of the standard axioms, the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle should not be violated, while
subgroup decomposability adds tremendously to inter-
pretability and would therefore be useful in most environ-
mental justice applications. We have proposed five
additional axioms that are specific to health benefits anal-
ysis. While there are undoubtedly many additional axi-
oms that could be imposed, this subset should provide an
interpretable and meaningful inequality indicator with-
out being excessively constraining. In the next section, we
review some key inequality indicators and interpret them
given the above axioms.
Evaluation of Key Inequality Indicators
To select an appropriate inequality indicator for health
benefits analysis, we first surveyed the literature to find
measures previously applied or proposed in the eco-
nomic, sociologic, or environmental science fields. Meas-
ures were collected through searches in Social Sciences
Citation Index, Science Citation Index, Medline (Ovid)
and PubMed in June and July 2004, using the keywords:
inequality and health, inequality measure/measurement/
indicator, equity measure/measurement/indicator, and
all specific inequality measure names mentioned else-
where. The intent was not to provide an exhaustive list of
all publications, but to find a representative sample of
indicators.
Since any inequality indicator will implicitly or explicitly
incorporate social judgments and will capture an underly-
ing philosophy about inequality [24], it was important to
describe and understand the characteristics of each indica-
tor across a number of dimensions. Thus, for each ine-
quality measure, we compiled information related to its
quantitative definition, original derivation and rationale,
underlying philosophy, and past applications. We then
evaluated each measure relative to the axioms proposed
above. Of note, axioms 6–9 are related to the context in
which the indicator is used, so we focus herein on the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, subgroup decomposabil-
ity, and the ability to avoid imposing a value judgment
about the relative importance of transfers at different per-
centiles of the risk distribution.
We examined two major categories of inequality measures
that have some important contrasts – summary measures
and social welfare functions. Summary measures (or pos-
itive measures) function to create an absolute measure
that matches the degree of inequality inherent, but do not
explicitly incorporate a concept of social welfare [43]. In
contrast, social welfare functions (or normative measures)
are derived for the explicit formulation of social welfare,
which some have argued is preferable to summary meas-
ures [24]. Normative measures lack some of the implicit
assumptions regarding the form of the social welfare func-
tion, which may limit the comparability of the measures
but can also be a primary attribute and strength of these
measures.
Although many indicators have previously been proposed
or applied, we found 19 distinct indicators through our
search that merited further investigation. We focus our
discussion on five measures (two summary measures and
three social welfare functions) that were either commonly
used in past inequality applications, were discussed at
length in review articles, or were likely candidates given
our axiomatic approach.
1. Gini index
The Gini index was the most commonly used inequality
measure, with applications that were predominantly
based on income [53-60] but also included health [61-
63], and environmental health risk [16,18] or emissions
[12,13]. It is formally defined as one-half the relative
mean difference, which is the arithmetic average of the
absolute differences between pairs of measures (Table 3).
It can also be derived from the Lorenz curve, equaling
twice the area between this curve and the 45-degree line
representing total equality [54]. The Gini coefficient
reflects the measurement of individual complaints rela-International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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tive to all those better off, using an additive principle of
equality [36].
The Gini index satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer princi-
ple, but has a number of limitations in its standard form.
The transfer sensitivity depends on the rank of incomes
rather than the absolute values. This yields weights that
appear somewhat arbitrary [64], with weights that are
translation invariant and with more weight attached to
transfers in the middle of the distribution [54,65]. More-
over, the Gini index is not subgroup decomposable into
within-group and between-group components unless
subgroups can be strictly ordered by income [55,65-67].
Finally, it imposes an implicit value judgment about the
segments of the distribution that matter most. Extensions
to the Gini have been developed that can incorporate var-
ying value judgments [59,66], enhancing its utility for
health benefits analysis. However, given the difficulty
with subgroup decomposability and the fact that the
weights attached to health risks would not change with a
constant addition of risk, the Gini index may not be inter-
pretable for many combined environmental justice/
health benefits analyses, but could be considered in sensi-
tivity analyses.
2. Variance of logarithms
The variance of logarithms is a straightforward measure of
dispersion, which has previously been considered in
reviews of inequality indicators [24,54]. It has the theoret-
ical appeal of simplicity, especially for lognormally dis-
tributed data (Table 3). Like a number of simple measures
of dispersion, the variance of logarithms represents a rela-
tive to the average view of individual complaints and a
weighted additive principle for summation across individ-
ual complaints [36].
However, the variance of logarithms violates the principle
of transfers, with marginal transfers from high-risk to low-
risk increasing the variance of logarithms if the high value
is greater than e times the geometric mean of the distribu-
tion [68]. Moreover, it implicitly attaches more weight to
transfers at the low end of the distribution than to trans-
fers at the high end of the distribution [36]. The variance
of logarithms is only decomposable if geometric means
replace arithmetic means in the subgroup data, which
places greater emphasis on the low end of the distribution
[69]. The variance of logarithms is therefore not applica-
ble to health benefits analysis.
3. Squared coefficient of variation (SQV)
The summary measures considered above are not ideal for
health benefits analysis, in part because of difficulties with
subgroup decomposability. The family of generalized
entropy measures was derived specifically to be decom-
posable, allowing for neat decomposition into within-
group and between-group terms, in which total inequality
is an additive function of between-group and within-
group inequality [65,69]. Moreover, these generalized
entropy measures incorporate a constant, θ, which deter-
mines the relative sensitivity of the entropy indices [69].
Table 3: Summary of Inequality Indicators Evaluated for Health Benefits Analysis.
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When θ is less than 1, the index is more sensitive to the
lower end of the distribution, and when θ is greater than
1, there is more sensitivity at the high end. Generalized
entropy measures therefore have significant appeal for
health benefits analysis.
The first of the generalized entropy measures we consider
is the squared coefficient of variation (SQV; Table 3). This
represents the generalized entropy measure when θ equals
2. As in any case where θ is specified, the benefit of having
the sensitivity parameter is lost unless multiple general-
ized entropy measures are used in the analysis. The SQV,
or the coefficient of variation itself, has been used in past
economic applications [54,55,70]. Although the SQV is
decomposable, the within-group components and their
weights are not independent of the between-group com-
ponents [71]. In addition, as with the variance of loga-
rithms, the SQV fails the principle of transfers for high
values. Thus, we reject the SQV for health benefits analy-
sis.
4. Atkinson index
The Atkinson index is a member of the generalized
entropy family of indicators, explicitly incorporating nor-
mative judgments about social welfare [54,66,72]. The
Atkinson index was derived for income inequality [54]
and has been applied in this context [53,55,57,61,73,74]
as well as for health [75] and access to health care [76].
For income inequality, it is derived by calculating the
equity-sensitive average income, which is defined as the
level of per capita income which, if uniformly possessed,
would make total welfare exactly equal to the total welfare
generated by the actual income distribution. Societal pref-
erences for equality are incorporated through an explicit
parameter ε, which is ordinally equivalent to 1-θ in the
generalized entropy equation for values of θ < 1 [26]
(Table 3). When ε > 0, there is a societal preference for
equality, and as ε rises, society attaches more weight to
income transfers at the lower end of the distribution. In an
extreme case, an infinite value of ε would represent the
Rawlsian concept of providing the greatest benefit to the
least advantaged [36,77]. Typical values of ε applied in the
literature range from 0.25 to 2.0 [54,57,61].
Aside from including an explicit parameter for degree of
inequality averseness, the Atkinson index fulfills the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and is subgroup decom-
posable. Given the non-linear transformation of the gen-
eralized entropy index, the between-group and within-
group components do not sum exactly to total inequality
[65]. Instead, the functional relationship can be expressed
as:
(1 - Atotal) = (1 - Awithin)(1 - Abetween) [78].
Thus, the Atkinson index satisfies our proposed axioms
and merits consideration.
5. Theil's measures of inequality
The final generalized entropy measures we consider are
two indices derived by Theil [71], the mean log deviation
(for which θ = 0) and the Theil's entropy index (for which
θ = 1) (Table 3). Both the mean log deviation [57,70] and
the Theil's entropy index [53,55,61] have had multiple
applications in the economic literature. The two Theil ine-
quality indices are additively decomposable with inde-
pendence of within-group and between-group inequality
[69,70], offering different weighting options for the sub-
groups, and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
Moreover, the indices have some theoretical appeal based
upon concepts from information theory – the expected
information content of a situation can be considered as
the sum of the information content weighted by the
respective probabilities. However, these indices have been
criticized for the lack of intuition regarding the calculation
of the "average of the logarithms of the reciprocals of
income shares weighted by income shares" [43], and the
upper bound of the Theil's entropy index depends on
sample size. Since neither of these critiques invalidates the
use of Theil's indices, we do not reject these indices,
although the specification of θ implies that they should
only be used in combination with other indicators, most
likely in sensitivity analyses.
Summary
We conclude that the Atkinson index is the indicator that
best addresses the needs of inequality assessment in
health benefits analysis, as it does not violate the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle, allows for subgroup decompos-
ability, and includes an explicit "inequality averseness"
parameter that could allow inequality to be evaluated
across a range of societal viewpoints. The downside of
selecting a single indicator is that it provides only one sta-
tistical formulation and one combination of viewpoints
from Tables 1 and 2. Using Theil's indices in addition to
the Atkinson index can address the former concern,
although the functional forms are quite similar and the
measures have been highly correlated in past applications
[61]. Simultaneously evaluating the extended Gini index
could address the latter concern, but may only be inter-
pretable in selected contexts (i.e., where subgroup decom-
posability is unimportant and where it is logical to
consider ranks rather than relative values). In our illustra-
tive example, we therefore focus on the Atkinson index
but provide some sensitivity calculations using the Gini
index and Theil's indices.
Illustrative Example
To demonstrate the potential applicability of inequality
indices for health benefits analysis, we provide an illustra-International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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tive pollution control example. Suppose that there are 10
geographic areas affected by a given pollutant, numbered
sequentially 1 through 10. Each area contains 100 people
of either Type A or Type B, where Type B represents a high-
risk population of concern to policymakers. Table 4
shows the number of people of each type in each area, as
well as the initial exposure to some pollutant, which for
simplicity corresponds to the area number. We assume
that the risk from this pollutant is twice as high for Type B
people than for Type A people. Since the selected inequal-
ity measures are scale invariant, for simplicity, we assign a
risk per unit exposure of 2 for Type B people and 1 for
Type A people. Thus, at baseline, we have a total risk of
8800 units, of which 6600 are associated with Type B and
2200 with Type A people. We consider this to be Scenario
1.
Now, suppose that we have the opportunity to remove 5
units of exposure by reducing exposure by 50% in any
geographic areas we choose. Note that elimination of
exposure is not considered (as this would cause errors in
the Atkinson index for values of e greater than 1, and is
usually unrealistic in a pollution control setting), and par-
tial reductions are not considered for simplicity's sake. For
each control strategy (consisting of 50% exposure reduc-
tions in a subset of geographic areas), we can therefore
determine the total health benefits, the change in the
Atkinson index for a given value of θ (or the change in
other indices), the change in the between-group Atkinson
(i.e., inequality between A and B), and the change in the
within-group Atkinson (i.e., inequality across geographic
areas).
First considering the baseline level of inequality, total ine-
quality with the Atkinson index ranges from 0.14 for ε =
0.5 to 0.85 for ε = 10, demonstrating how increasing aver-
sion to inequality raises the Atkinson index. The corre-
sponding baseline inequality values are 0.41 for the Gini
index, 0.35 for the mean log deviation, and 0.27 for
Theil's entropy index. Note that little useful information
can be gained by comparing the absolute magnitudes of
these inequality indicators, other than the fact that the
extent of inequality depends on the indicator and/or
parameter. The key in this context is whether the policy
decision would be sensitive to the choice of indicator.
As shown in Figure 1, removing 5 units of exposure from
Area 10 is optimal from both an efficiency and equality
standpoint, based on the Atkinson index. This is unsur-
prising, as this reduces exposure from a site with the high-
est exposure and the greatest number of high-risk
individuals. If for some reason this control strategy is not
viable, there is no clear-cut optimal strategy. For small val-
ues of ε (representing less inequality averseness), the more
efficient strategies are also preferable from an inequality
perspective. As ε increases, we find an efficiency-equality
tradeoff, with four control strategies considered viable for
at least one value of ε (control at Areas 1 and 9, 2 and 8, 3
and 7, or 4 and 6). The remaining control strategies are
strictly dominated, as they have both lower health bene-
fits and a higher Atkinson index. Using the Gini index, the
Theil' s entropy index, or the mean log deviation yields
patterns similar to those for the Atkinson index with low
values of ε, with more efficient strategies generally appear-
ing more equal as well (Figure 1). Looking at between-
group and within-group inequality (Figure 2) illustrates
that the more efficient strategy is always preferable from a
between-group inequality perspective, due to the fact that
these strategies remove more exposure from larger groups
of high-risk (Type B) individuals. The optimal strategies
for within-group inequality are similar to that for total
inequality.
Scenario 1 is fairly straightforward and yields uncontro-
versial findings, given that areas with more high-risk peo-
ple also have higher exposures. Now, suppose that the
situation is more complex (Scenario 2), where the geo-
graphic areas with more high-risk individuals have lower
exposures (i.e., area 1 has an exposure of 10, and area 10
has an exposure of 1). For this scenario, all inequality
indicators at baseline are lower (Atkinson of 0.07 for ε =
0.5 and 0.67 for ε = 10, Gini index of 0.28, mean log devi-
ation of 0.24, Theil's entropy index of 0.13), reflecting a
more equitable distribution of risks.
Figure 3 illustrates that there is no single dominant policy
strategy based on the Atkinson index, regardless of the
value of ε used. Of the 10 policy options, six are strictly
dominated from both efficiency and equality standpoints
for all values of ε and would not be considered further.
Choosing among the remaining policies depends on the
degree to which one is willing to trade increases in effi-
ciency for decreases in equality as well as on general pref-
erences for equality. The Gini index, Theil's entropy index,
and the mean log deviation yield the same four strategies
on the optimal frontier as the Atkinson indices (control-
ling at 4 and 6; 2, 3, and 5; 1, 2, 3, and 4; and 10).
For Scenario 2, between-group inequality is lower than in
the previous case (Figure 4). A subset of five policy
options would reduce between-group inequality
(although these are not identical to the optimal policy
options for total inequality). Given small between-group
inequality, within-group inequality is nearly identical to
total inequality (Figure 4). If we wanted to restrict our-
selves to policies that were in the optimal frontier from all
three perspectives for all values of ε evaluated, we would
choose between controlling at Areas 1, 2, 3, and 4 and
controlling at Areas 2, 3, and 5.International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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Discussion
We have demonstrated that it is plausible to quantify
changes in inequality within a health benefits analysis,
potentially informing concerns about inequity. The Atkin-
son index is the single indicator that best fulfills basic axi-
oms and has two key characteristics crucial for health
benefits analysis – the ability to evaluate the indicator for
a variety of societal weights attached to inequality, and the
ability to decompose the indicator to determine subgroup
inequality. Additional indicators that have more limited
applicability and interpretability, such as the Gini index,
the Theil's entropy index, or the mean log deviation, allow
us to evaluate the sensitivity of our findings to the under-
lying structure of the indicator. Our illustrative example
demonstrates how efficiency-equality tradeoffs can be
explicitly considered, at least in a simplified context, and
how the subset of policy choices can be limited to those
on the optimal frontier across levels of inequality averse-
ness.
Although our analytical approach provides a mechanism
to incorporate inequality and inequity issues into health
benefits analysis, there are numerous limitations, and it is
important to acknowledge that this sort of analysis will
only be meaningful in selected contexts. First, the Atkin-
son index reflects only one way of measuring individual
complaints and aggregating across those complaints: a
"relative to the average" view (Table 1) combined with a
"weighted additive" principle of equality (Table 2) [36].
As articulated above, environmental justice advocates
may be more concerned with comparisons to all those
better off, while health benefits analysis generally adopts
an additive framework. Thus, the Atkinson index is a rea-
sonable compromise between competing world views,
but ultimately may not satisfy either one. Evaluating
whether conclusions differ with the Gini index, which
captures the above viewpoints but violates other criteria,
can help to limit this issue.
In addition, we have only focused on the health benefits
side of benefit-cost analysis and have not considered
costs. Clearly, if the costs of an environmental regulation
would be disproportionately borne by segments of the
population, it would be important to incorporate that fact
into the analysis. This adds another layer of analytical
complexity, as the distributions of economic impacts of
environmental policies are rarely estimated in enough
detail to incorporate into our analytical framework.
Future analyses should consider mechanisms to more
explicitly incorporate the distribution of costs into our
proposed framework.
Some of our proposed axioms also have implications that
may not necessarily be desirable. For example, a scenario
with uniform pollutant exposures and uniform relative
risks from that pollutant could be considered "unequal" if
baseline health disparities existed for other reasons. It
could be argued that the equity-related goal of environ-
mental policy should be to achieve uniformity in pollut-
ant exposures across all individuals, with underlying
health disparities to be resolved through other policy
mechanisms. However, the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.A.
7408 as amended) requires the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to "protect the health of sensitive or suscepti-
ble individuals or groups". Thus, the EPA would consider
lower pollution exposure necessary for individuals who
are more sensitive to that pollutant, which implies that
differential exposures would be desirable.
The above limitations are largely theoretical, but there is a
significant practical barrier in implementing our pro-
posed framework. Information about differential risk per
unit exposure is rarely available to the extent necessary,
especially stratified across sociodemographic covariates of
interest [21]. This limitation can be clearly seen within
recent regulatory impact analyses [48,49], which esti-
mated health benefits assuming all subpopulations to
have identical susceptibility and provided no spatial or
Table 4: Baseline Exposure and Population Characteristics for Illustrative Pollution Control Example (Scenario 1)
Geographic Area/
Exposure Level




Total Risk, Type A
People
Total Risk, Type B
People
1 1 0 0012 1 0 00
29 01 0 2 4 1 8 04 0
3 8 0 2 036 2 4 0 1 2 0
4 7 0 3 048 2 8 0 2 4 0
5 60 40 5 10 300 400
6 50 50 6 12 300 600
7 40 60 7 14 280 840
8 30 70 8 16 240 1120
9 20 80 9 18 180 1440
10 10 90 10 20 100 1800
Total 550 450 2200 6600International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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Health benefits and changes in inequality indicators for Scenario 1; High-risk people are highly exposed see – Table 4 for details Figure 1
Health benefits and changes in inequality indicators for Scenario 1; High-risk people are highly exposed – see Table 4 for 
details. The numbers in the plot refer to the geographic areas in which exposure was reduced by 50%. X-axes = Health bene-
fits, Y-axes = inequality benefits (positive numbers imply decreases in inequality).International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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Health benefits and changes in between-group and within-group Atkinson index for Scenario 1; High-risk people are highly  exposed see – Table 4 for details Figure 2
Health benefits and changes in between-group and within-group Atkinson index for Scenario 1; High-risk people are highly 
exposed – see Table 4 for details. The numbers in the plot refer to the geographic areas in which exposure was reduced by 
50%. X-axes = Health benefits, Y-axes = inequality benefits (positive numbers imply decreases in inequality).International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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Health benefits and changes in inequality indicators for Scenario 2; Low-risk people are highly exposed – the scenario is as pre- sented in Table 4, but area 1 has exposure 10, area 2 has exposure 9, etc Figure 3
Health benefits and changes in inequality indicators for Scenario 2; Low-risk people are highly exposed – the scenario is as pre-
sented in Table 4, but area 1 has exposure 10, area 2 has exposure 9, etc. The numbers in the plot refer to the geographic 
areas in which exposure was reduced by 50%. X-axes = Health benefits, Y-axes = inequality benefits (positive numbers imply 
decreases in inequality).International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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Health benefits and changes in between-group and within-group Atkinson index for Scenario 2; Low-risk people are highly  exposed – the scenario is as presented in Table 4, but area 1 has exposure 10, area 2 has exposure 9, etc Figure 4
Health benefits and changes in between-group and within-group Atkinson index for Scenario 2; Low-risk people are highly 
exposed – the scenario is as presented in Table 4, but area 1 has exposure 10, area 2 has exposure 9, etc. The numbers in the 
plot refer to the geographic areas in which exposure was reduced by 50%. X-axes = Health benefits, Y-axes = inequality bene-
fits (positive numbers imply decreases in inequality).International Journal for Equity in Health 2006, 5:2 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/5/1/2
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demographic breakdowns of benefits. It is this historical
omission within risk assessment of geographic or demo-
graphic patterns of risk, susceptible subpopulations, or
cumulative environmental burdens that led many envi-
ronmental justice advocates to question its applicability
[18,79,80]. Even setting aside this problem, the welfare
measure of concern in this case (unlike measures such as
income) is clearly hard to quantify with precision. Uncer-
tainty in the welfare measure would be important to
explicitly incorporate into the analysis, as non-linear ine-
quality indicators may lead to important differences
between the inequality of the expected values of the wel-
fare measures and the expected value of the inequality
measure. These limitations do not preclude the develop-
ment of a theoretical framework for incorporating equity
into health benefits analysis, but they provide a caution-
ary note about implementation.
In addition, while our approach allows certain policy
options to be rejected due to strict dominance across both
efficiency and equality measures, it does not help deci-
sion-makers choose among policy options that lie on the
optimal tradeoff frontier. Further research would be
needed to ascertain the degree to which individuals are
willing to trade off efficiency for equality, as well as the
dependence of this tradeoff on the absolute level of risk
and the policy context.
A final limitation is perhaps the most significant – in spite
of some of the appealing aspects of our proposed frame-
work, it is possible that neither risk assessors nor environ-
mental justice advocates will consider these indicators
meaningful enough to influence policy decisions. Risk
assessors have raised concerns previously that narrowly
focused conceptualizations of equity could produce per-
verse and undesirable outcomes [81] and that attempts to
incorporate distributional concerns into an analysis are
doomed to be both crude and controversial [82]. Simi-
larly, our approach could be considered as reductionist
and outcome-driven by environmental justice advocates,
not addressing their core concerns.
However, it is important to recognize the current state of
the science and the advancements our framework pro-
vides. The literature to date has been limited, and the few
applications that considered methods to quantify the dis-
tribution of risk used the Gini coefficient without consid-
eration of its underlying meaning [12,13,18], and did not
apply the inequality indicator in an interpretable fashion.
An axiomatic approach that allows for an array of concep-
tualizations of equity would start to respond to the con-
cerns of risk assessors. Moreover, process equity is
generally viewed as a means to achieve outcome equity,
and perceptions about outcomes may influence percep-
tions about process, and vice versa [83]. Thus, our frame-
work should contribute to better linkages between
environmental justice and risk assessment applications,
even if it cannot resolve the core philosophical differences
between these disciplines.
Conclusion
We have proposed an axiomatic approach to develop ine-
quality indicators that are meaningful in health benefits
analysis, an important application of risk assessment
methodology. The Atkinson index best satisfies our major
axioms, and if applied appropriately, can help to quantify
the changes in equality of health risk at the same time as
changes in the magnitude of health risk are estimated. An
illustrative pollution control example demonstrates the
efficiency-equality tradeoffs that may be present and the
degree to which they depend on society's inequality
averseness. Further study will focus on the application of
the Atkinson index (and other meaningful inequality
indicators) in actual health benefits analysis situations to
determine the practical significance and the data limita-
tions (i.e., evaluating the efficiency and equity implica-
tions of various power plant pollution control strategies).
In addition, future studies should explore the equity per-
ceptions of key stakeholders to allow for refinement of the
analytical framework.
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